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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PHRASE "TRESPASSORY VOYEURISM" IN THE 
LEWDNESS STATUTE REQUIRES A PROPERTY TRESPASS. 
The State creatively argues that the term "voyeurism" does not necessarily imply 
non-consensual behavior, so that the modifying term "trespassory" in the Utah 
lewdness statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-9-702(1), is intended to address the element of 
invasion of privacy rather than of property trespass. 
While voyeuristic situations could be imagined where the viewing of the sexual 
organs of another would be consensual, the State's argument is flawed because the 
usually accepted meaning of the term "voyeurism" does in fact include the element of 
surreptitiousness, or non-consent. As simply put by the Court of Appeals of Indiana in 
the case of Rodqers v. Martinsville School Corporation, 521 N.E. 2d 1322 (Ind. App. 
1988), "[t]he definition of voyeurism in the vernacular is peeping torn." id. at 1323. The 
ordinary meaning of "voyeurism" thus already includes an invasion of privacy. Even the 
dictionary references relied on by the State as authority for its argument acknowledge 
this by stating that voyeurism is "generally" from "a secret vantage point." Moreover, it 
is the "ordinary" or "usually accepted" meaning which is the interpretive standard under 
Utah law. Hansen v. Hansen. 958 P.2d 931 (Utah App. 1998). 
Accordingly, the State's attempt to torture the plain meaning of the lewdness 
statute must fail. The phrase "trespassory voyeurism" requires more than a simple 
invasion of privacy, and the additional requirement is an actual property trespass, in 
keeping with the plain meaning of "trespassory." As set forth in Defendant's opening 
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brief, this is consistent with other criminal provisions in the Utah Code and with the 
voyeurism statutes of other states. 
II. THE LEWDNESS STATUTE IS VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS AS 
APPLIED IF A PROPERTY TRESPASS IS NOT REQUIRED. 
The State also argues that the Utah lewdness statute is not void-for-vagueness 
as applied to the facts of this case because Dr. Lyman "knew his behavior was 
criminal."1 Not only does the State presume facts not in evidence2 - Dr. Lyman plead 
nolo contendere to the lewdness charge which is the subject of this appeal-but also, 
the arguable knowledge of the Defendant is irrelevant to whether the lewdness statute 
is unconstitutionally vague as applied. The proper test is whether the lewdness statute 
defines the offense "with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand 
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement." State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). The Utah lewdness statute does not meet this test unless "trespassory 
voyeurism" is interpreted to require a property trespass, since an ordinary person 
would not understand that "trespassory" referred to something besides a property 
trespass, and therefore would not have been given constitutionally adequate notice of 
the conduct proscribed. 
defendant has not challenged the constitutionality of the lewdness statute on its 
face, but only as applied to the particular facts of this case, so this reply brief will not 
address the State's irrelevant facial vagueness argument. 
2The State's brief, despite extensive "factual" recitations, completely fails to cite 
to the Record as required by Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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III. THE CATCHALL PROVISION OF THE LEWDNESS STATUTE DOES I 
PROHIBIT THE DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED CONDUCT. 
Assuming tt lat the phrase"trespassory voyeurism" is void-for-vagueness as 
applied, the State asserts that Dr. Lyman's alleged conduct was prohibited by the 
"catchall" provision of the lewdness statute. This argument is not well founded. 
The relevant statutory language is as follows:". . . any other act of lewdness if i a 
public place or under circumstances which the person should know will likely cause 
affront or ala? - rs < if ai)e L i i ilk lei 
Utah Code Ann. §76-9-702(1). This language clearly contemplates that either the lewd 
act be performed in i public place-which is undeniably not the case here- or that the 
lewd act would predictably cause affront to another. The surreptitious viewing at issue 
in this case, by virtue of its being from a distance and secret, could not have been 
directly "to" or "on" or "in the presence" of anothf used affront to 
the tanning patron because it was unknown to the patron. Voyeurism is simply not 
conduct "to J catchall 
language of the statute. And, again, it would be unconstitutional, under the 
void-for-vagueness as applied tlodnnt I i the statute to now be so construed in this 
case. 
IV. THIS COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE CASE 
OF AMERICAN FORK CITY V. CARR AND SHOULD NOT 
FOLLOW ITS ERRONEOUS HOLDING. 
Finally, the State argues that the doctrine of stare decisis binds this Court to 
follow the decisioi n American Fork City v. Carr, 
P.2d 717 (Utah App. 1998). Defendant's opening brief, and this reply brief, set forth the 
specific bases for why the "trespassory voyeurism" provision of the Utah lewdness 
statute must be interpreted so as to require a property trespass. The Carr case was 
thus wrongly decided, and contrary to the State's assertion, the doctrine of stare decisis 
does not rigidly bind this Court to follow that flawed decision. 
Rather, applying the factors set forth in Hackerford v. Utah Power and Light. 740 
P.2d 1218 (Utah 1987) this Court could and should revisit the issue of the proper 
interpretation of the phrase "trespassory voyeurism." The Carr interpretation is not 
plausible, has not worked itself into the law, there are strong arguments for changing 
the interpretation, and it would be easy to do so. This Court should therefore exercise 
its discretion and not follow the erroneous Carr holding. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, and in Defendant's opening brief, Dr. Lyman's 
lewdness conviction should be vacated. 
Dated this l$_~day of April, 1999. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
NEIL A. KAPLAN 
ANNELI R. SMITH 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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